INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarizes the available evidence on how the global crisis aff ected the labour market and social inequalities in Hungary in the fi rst years of the crisis. Most of what is presented is based on longitudinal micro data covering fi rms and individuals observed in 2008 and 2009 .
The eff ect of labour market developments on social inequality was ambiguous. In the public sector, real wages fell by more than 10 per cent in 2009, while employment remained practically unchanged (it even grew thanks to increased infl ows to public works schemes). Given that public sector employees are better educated and older, on average, than private sector workers, the cutting of their wages diminished rather than augmented inequality of earnings. At the same time, their better prospects of remaining in their jobs had an inequality enhancing eff ect.
In the private sector, employment was cut by almost 7 per cent in 2009, while real wages fell only marginally. Once compositional changes are controlled for, we fi nd no statistically signifi cant links between fi rm-level average wage changes and fi rm characteristics (size, sector, ownership, unionization) , apart from an eff ect of a rise in the basic minimum wage in January 2009. Likewise, the individual panel data suggest that the distribution of earnings remained virtually unchanged except for the shift of minimum wage earners from the old to the new mandatory fl oors. Monthly working time was slightly shortened by a magnitude of about 1 per cent. Working time reductions probably did not extend beyond some national and local programmes providing job retention subsidies, which typically required that fi rms classify their subsidized employees as part-timers. The data suggest that enterprises reacted to the crisis by bringing hiring to a halt rather than by substantially increasing lay-off s -this provides part of the explanation of why 'hard adjustment' prevailed in the private sector. The contraction of labour demand aff ected the less educated and younger workers slightly more than others, implying an increase in inequality.
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At the same time, men were worse aff ected than women, which had an equality-enhancing eff ect. Government policies were aimed at minimizing job losses, on the one hand, and creating socially useful jobs, on the other. The eligibility and entitlement criteria pertaining to unemployment insurance did not change. Thanks to the improving composition of the fl ows to unemployment in terms of benefi t eligibility and labour force attachment, the share of those losing their job receiving unemployment benefi t increased, while the fraction receiving some kind of fi nancial assistance did not fall. While unemployment insurance at least partly fulfi lled its function as an automatic stabilizer, the huge amounts spent by the government on saving a relatively small number of jobs reduced the resources available for unemployment relief. The budgets for active labour market policies and employment services were markedly cut and the absolute number of unassisted prime-age people out of work increased substantially.
The available data suggest that income inequality did not change significantly until the end of 2009. The relative position of the poorest quintile deteriorated but the magnitude of change was far less dramatic than it was during the post-communist transformational recession. At the same time, growing energy bills and debt servicing brought many low-income households to the edge of fi nancial ruin, which contributed to a feeling of desolation and despair unprecedented since the hardest years of the transition.
THE CRISIS IN BRIEF

Magnitudes of the Downturn
Hungary, as a small open economy deeply integrated in European product and fi nancial markets, has been hit hard by the crisis since October 2008. Already before the crisis the country had been struggling with fi scal imbalances and political distrust for several years. After several years of irresponsible fi scal policies (on both sides), in 2006 the budget defi cit came within reach of 10 per cent of GDP, forcing the government to instigate an austerity programme. Economic growth was slowing before the crisis and fi scal imbalances made the economy particularly vulnerable to outside shocks.
As shown in Table 7 .1, in 2008, real GDP increased slightly -by 0.5 per cent -but fell by 6.3 per cent in 2009. Industrial output and exports decreased substantially: by 17.7 and 12.2 per cent, respectively. Despite the starting of several EU-sponsored development programmes, investment fell by 9 per cent. The shock was magnifi ed by a dramatic depreciation of the forint (at the extremes: 235 HUF/euro in August 2008 and 320 HUF/ euro in March 2009), which proved insuffi cient to eff ectively support exports but gave rise to sometimes unmanageable problems for fi rms and households indebted in hard currency.
1 At the brink of fi nancial collapse, Hungary had to apply to the IMF, the World Bank and the EU for loans amounting to a total of 20 billion euros. The government, committed to keeping the budget defi cit below 4 per cent in 2009 and to push it down further in 2010, introduced a series of austerity measures, which included the abolition of 'thirteenth-month' wages and pensions, the abolition of the Swiss indexation of pensions, scenarios for increasing the retirement age from 62 to 65 years and shortening paid leave for mothers from three to two years, the cutting of the fl at rate per child family allowance and the curtailing of subsidies and allowances for housing, heating, transport and farming. As a result of the austerity measures, the increase in the budget defi cit could be kept to a mere 0.2 percentage points. This fi scal success, however, also meant that the Hungarian government had limited resources to counteract market forces.
Institutions Conditioning the Response
The government's inclination to react to the crisis by across-the-board wage cuts in the public sector (via abolition of the 'thirteenth-month' salary and the freezing of further wage increases) is easy to justify. On the one hand, severance payments and procedural rules make fi ring costly and time-consuming in the public sector, while wage cuts are relatively easy to pass, given the limits of skill transferability (for example, in the case of doctors and older teachers), and considering that the public sector historically has attracted workers ready to trade off wages for increased job security. In the private sector, the optimality of staff reductions as opposed to wage cuts and hours reductions is far less obvious. In a monopoly trade union setting or in the case of effi cient bargaining we expect that the burden of adjustment will fall predominantly on employment (McDonald and Solow 1982; Brueckner 2001) . Similar conclusions follow from the theories of implicit contracts (Azariadis 1975; Feldstein 1976 Feldstein , 1978 Rosen 1985) and intertemporal substitution (Lucas and Rapping 1969) . Despite the theoretical predictions of strong cyclicality in employment and less in wages, both the macroeconomic and the micro evidence are mixed. In a recent study of the cyclicality of manufacturing employment and wages between 1960 and 2004 , Messina, Strozzi and Turunen (2009 fi nd substantial cross-country variations, even after controlling for type of data and methods used in measuring cyclicality. They identify positive correlation between the cyclicality of real wages and the cyclicality of employment, but identify groups of countries with diff erent positions along these dimensions. The available data on the current crisis also suggest strong diversity across countries. While comprehensive wage statistics on 2009 are not yet available, the data on changes in GDP, employment and working hours show high cross-country dispersion in the responses of employment to GDP, as well as in the relative importance of employment adjustment versus hours reductions (Verick and Islam 2010, 25-27.) In a transitory downturn, cutting hours and wages can prove to be attractive options if hiring and fi ring costs are high or large, fi rm-fi nanced investments in fi rm-specifi c skills are yet to be recouped. When plant utilization is temporarily low, fi rms may also prefer training their workers since the costs of accumulating fi rm-specifi c skills are lower. Reacting to a negative shock in ways other than dismissals is easier if some institutions supporting the adjustment of hours and wages are at hand, as emphasized in Bellmann and Gerner (2010) . One institution of this kind is working time accounts, which enable employees to work longer or shorter hours than usual and thereby collect working time credits or debits in an individual account, which are later compensated for by additional leisure or work. Similarly, softer measures can be encouraged by pacts on employment and competitiveness, in which employees accept lower wages and reduced working time and employers guarantee jobs and training, and off er fi nancial participation (Bellmann, Gerlach and Meyer 2008) . Profi t sharing can also make wage adjustment easier since it establishes an automatic link between workers' pay and the fl uctuations of business fortunes.
The institutional features of the Hungarian labour market make the adjustment of both employment and wages relatively easy, but there are few formal agreements and legal institutions which explicitly encourage a heterodox reaction to a negative shock. (Fazekas et al. 2010 , no similar data are available for 2001). The agreements are typically concluded with a single employer and are not extended. Furthermore, the unions seem to be relatively weak, as suggested by estimates of a small (0-2 per cent) regressionadjusted union wage gap (Neumann 2002; Rigó 2008) .
There are few legal constraints on employment and wage setting, the most important being the minimum wage. The minimum wage/average wage ratio (34.7 per cent just before the crisis) cannot be considered high by international comparison but the real minimum wage has been constantly growing in the past ten years. The adjustment of the minimum wage is negotiated annually by employer organizations and unions, permitting careful policies in hard times, but unions generally start negotiations with very ambitious goals and usually achieve at least modest increases in real terms.
3 This was the case at the beginning of the recent crisis, too, as discussed below.
Only a single estimate of adjustment costs is available (Kőrösi and Surányi 2003) , suggesting that the costs of hiring and fi ring are relatively low by international comparison. Training costs probably do not play an important role in fi rms' decisions since the fraction of Hungarians participating in adult training is one of the lowest in Europe and on-the-job training is particularly infrequent (Bajnai et al. 2009 ). Hungary's employment protection (EPL) index is the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe and one of the lowest in the EU (Cazes and Nesporova 2007) .
Institutions encouraging the combination of employment, hours and wage adjustment are undeveloped in Hungary. Formal agreements similar to the pacts for employment and competitiveness do not exist, to the best of the author's knowledge. Working time accounts have not been established as a legal institution, in contrast to the Czech Republic and Germany, for instance, where about half of the medium-sized and large companies are covered (Bellmann and Gerner 2010) . The fraction of workers covered by profi t-sharing agreements is one of the lowest in Europe, with Hungary above only Portugal and Cyprus (Eurofound 2007) . However, it would be wrong to conclude that such practices do not exist. We have ample anecdotal evidence that working time accounts are applied informally. Profi t sharing does exist informally, as suggested by a relatively high wage elasticity with regard to productivity (Commander and 
First Look at the Response
The monthly gross real wage fell by 10.7 per cent in the public sector, while employment grew by 3.6 per cent (Table 7 .2). This increase was explained entirely by infl ows to public works programmes. Excluding public works, employment fell marginally, by 0.4 per cent. The data on the private sector mirror what happened in the public sector. Employment fell dramatically by 6.6 per cent, while the average wage was only slightly aff ected, with a decline of 1.6 per cent in real terms. Wage developments were aff ected markedly by the rising minimum wages. In 2008, the regulations distinguished three mandatory minima: the base minimum wage (MW), the skilled minimum wage (SMW = 1.25MW) and a reduced minimum for younger skilled workers with fewer than three years' experience (YSMW = 1.2MW). In September 2008, the unions started negotiations with a demand for a 15.9 per cent rise in the MW, a 14.7 per cent rise in the YSMW and a 10.1 per cent rise in the SMW, starting from January 2009. Given a consensus infl ation forecast of 4.2 per cent at the start of the negotiations, these hikes would have implied 11.2, 10.0 and 6.3 per cent increases in the minima in real terms, respectively. Even at the end of November, two months after the beginning of the crisis, the unions demanded a 10.9 per cent rise in the base MW in nominal terms, and insisted on their original claims regarding the SMW. 4 Finally, under the pressure of the crisis and following a revision of the infl ation forecast (3.1-3.4 per cent) 5 the parties agreed a 3.6 per cent increase in the MW, a 5.1 per cent rise in the YSMW and a mere 0.8 per cent rise in the SMW in nominal terms. 6 The eff ects of these -ultimately minor -hikes can be clearly observed in Figure 7 .1, which shows the diff erence between the wage distributions of 2008 and 2009 -the negative and positive spikes show how workers shifted from the old to the new minima.
It is easy to check that, apart from the eff ect of the minimum wage, the density functions of 2008 and 2009 had virtually identical shapes. The stability of the wage distribution is also indicated by small movements in the inequality measures presented in Table 7 .3. The Gini and the Theil indicators remained virtually unchanged, while the CV -which is sensitive to changes at the top of the wage distribution -indicates a minor decrease in earnings inequality.
Average hours fell slightly, by 1.3 per cent in the public sector and 1.1 per cent in private fi rms, according to the establishment-based statistics, presented in Table 7 .2. The LFS data also hint at a fall of 1.1 per cent (0.4 hours) in the same target population. Furthermore, they suggest that the The deviation of fi rm-based and self-reported statistics on the share of workers with part-time contracts (percentage point changes of 1.7 versus 1.2) is probably explained by participation in the government-assisted 'four days work + one day training' schemes. 8 The offi cial working time of employees in the 4+1 programmes fell because the aff ected workers had to be reclassifi ed as part-timers. At the same time, the self-reported hours of such workers did not necessarily change: most probably, many of them interpreted training on the fi fth day as work. According to the establishment-based statistics, 9 the number of part-time employees in fi rms employing fi ve or more workers increased by 36,800 in 2008-2009, while job retention subsidies aff ected 52,000 workers. These data lead us to believe that working time reductions outside the subsidized fi rms occurred infrequently, if at all. 
FIRM-LEVEL CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT, HOURS AND WAGES IN 2008-2009
In this section, we look at variations in the changes of employment, hours and wages using longitudinal fi rm-level data covering May 2008 and 2009. We shall be particularly interested in the infl uence of institutions potentially moderating or enhancing the eff ects of the crisis: state ownership, union cover-age and the minimum wage. The available data are insuffi cient for an estimation of a full causal model, explaining how the crisis aff ected fi rms' decisions on the level and skill composition of employment and wages. Most importantly, we do not have, as yet, fi rm-level data on changes in output or other variables capturing the size of the shock to which fi rms had to respond. This will be approximated with two-digit industry-level data on changes in output which, admittedly, is second-best solution. Equally important, the identifi cation of causal eff ects in a system with several endogenous variables (employment, hours, skill composition and wages) would require several exogenous variables having impact on a particular outcome without aff ecting other outcomes. Such instruments are not available in the data set. The available variables, such as fi rm size, industry, ownership, union coverage, exposure to the minimum wage and skill composition are likely to aff ect employment, hours and wages simultaneously. Therefore we shall have recourse to a descriptive three-equations model explaining the log change of employment (L), monthly working hours (H) and average hourly wages w.
The equations have the same set of explanatory variables (X), so the coeffi cients and the standard errors are the same as if the equations were estimated one by one with OLS. By estimating (7.1a-7.1c) jointly as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions we can benefi t from looking at the correlations between the residuals u, v and w and test whether the three equations are independent.
In a second step, we will show that the changes in average wages were strongly aff ected by changes in fi rms' skill composition. By regressing Dlnw on changes in the demographic and skill composition of the workforce and taking the residuals x 2 X i as in equation (7.2) we can get a measure that is controlled for compositional eff ects. (In the equation, AGE stands for average age, EDU denotes average years in school and MALE relates to the share of men.) Then, after replacing D ln w with x in equation (7.1c), we can check how the residual wages were aff ected by the Xs.
Data
The analysis relates to 5,173 fi rms observed in 2008 and 2009 in the Wage Survey (WS). The WS is carried out by the Public Employment Service (PES) annually, each May. All Hungarian fi rms employing more than 20 workers are obliged to fi ll in the WS questionnaire, while in the case of smaller fi rms a 20 per cent random sample is selected and obliged to report. The fi rms provide enterprise-level data (size, industry, ownership, employment) and individual data on their workers. Firms employing fewer than 50 workers report on all employees, while the larger ones report on a (roughly 10 per cent) random sample of their workers. The fi rms can be linked across waves directly, while workers can be identifi ed indirectly, with a margin of error, using data on their fi rm ID, date of birth, gender, education and job classifi cation. Out of the 9,054 enterprises reporting data in 2008, 5,428 were observed in 2009. Selection to the panel was mainly aff ected by the sampling design of the survey, but fi rm exit and non-response could also play a role. A medium-sized or large fi rm can vanish from the WS if it goes bankrupt or drops below the 20 workers limit and is not selected for the next year's randomly chosen small-fi rm sample. The probability that a small fi rm observed one year will also be observed the next year is 0.2 if it continues to employ fewer than 20 workers, and 1.0 if it grows large enough to be included in the 'medium-sized and large' category. In fact, out of the base period sample 39.5 per cent of the small fi rms and 71.7 per cent of the larger ones were observed in May 2009. Selection to the panel was analysed with probit and the inverse of the estimated survival probabilities were used as weights in the calculations (see Köllő 2010a for the estimation results).
The most important indicators related to fi rms in the panel are compared to the closest available fi gures of the CSO in Table 7 .5. We do not expect exactly the same indices since the published fi gures relate to April-June, while the WS data compare May 2008 and 2009 and the wage concepts are slightly diff erent, too. In the fi rm panel, compared to the published fi gures, employment fell more and hours fell slightly less. In the fi rm sample, the observed rates of change in real earnings vary in a range between 2 0.9 and 1.5 per cent, depending on whether bonuses are included or not. Furthermore, the sample-based estimates diff er from the published data because of a diff erence in the reference periods (Q2/Q2 in case of the published data versus May/May in the fi rm sample). The data of the fi rm panel nevertheless follow the same pattern as the CSO data in suggesting a considerable loss of jobs, minor downward adjustment of working hours and slightly changing real wages.
Before turning to the estimations, we identifi ed heavy outliers using a procedure proposed in Hadi (1992) . The procedure looks for one or more sub-populations where the linkages between some key variables follow a pattern sharply diff erent from the one characteristic of the whole population. Search for such a sub-population in the space of DlnL, DlnH and Dlnw -resulted in 255 outliers. As shown in Table 7 .6, these fi rms lost almost half of their staff in a year, their average working hours fell ten times faster than those of the non-outliers and their hourly nominal wages went up by 16.5 per cent as opposed to 3.8 per cent in the case of the non-outliers. The outliers were more likely to be in construction and administrative services, and less likely to be state-owned and agricultural companies than the non-outliers were, while other variables (size, ownership, union coverage, exposure to the minimum wage, industry and region) had no statistically signifi cant eff ect. The outliers seem to be collapsing fi rms and/ or companies whose structure changed considerably. In any case, their inclusion in a model looking at adjustment on the margins would hinder rather than help the analysis.
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In the estimations the hourly wage fi gure relates to total monthly remuneration (last row in Table 7 .5) divided by paid hours during the month. The data on industrial output (sales revenues defl ated with the producer price index in the tradable sectors and the consumer price index elsewhere) relate to 82 two-digit sectors and have 33 distinct values.
Regression Results
In the model presented in Table 7 .7, industry output has a signifi cant positive eff ect on both employment and hours and has no eff ect on wages. The elasticity of the fi rms' employment with respect to its industry's real sales revenues is fairly weak, at 0.06. The estimates are probably downwardbiased since the industry's change of output measures the fi rm-specifi c shocks with a wide margin of error. Unfortunately, fi rm-level data and three-or four-digit sector level data were not available at the time of writing. Male-dominated fi rms lost more jobs and had worse than average wage records. Firms in which the proportion of males was higher by one standard deviation (31 per cent) in the base period lost more jobs -about 1 per cent -and in terms of average wages (0.7 per cent). Average skills also seem to matter: a one standard deviation (1.5 year) diff erence in average years in school implied about 1 per cent higher employment and 1.1 per cent lower wages in 2009 relative to 2008. Average age had no eff ect on employment and hours, but it aff ected wages marginally: a workforce older by 6.3 years (one standard deviation) implied that wages grew more slowly by 0.6 per cent.
Firm size has a marked eff ect on employment and some impact on hours, while its eff ect on wages is insignifi cant. Small and medium-sized fi rms lost fewer jobs than large ones (300+ employees) by 8, 4, 2 and 2 per cent, respectively, as we move from the bottom to the top of the SME size categories. This pattern is probably explained by diff erences in exposure to exports: we fi nd the advantage of the smallest fi rms to be much greater (12 per cent) in manufacturing, where larger fi rms tend to be either exporters or suppliers of exporters, than in the rest of the economy (5 per cent).
As far as industry eff ects are concerned, the employment records of manufacturing, construction and real estate appear to be statistically identical, while the retail trade and hotels and restaurants seem to have lost fewer jobs. Three groups of sectors stand out: (i) water, energy and transport, (ii) personal services, fi nance and insurance and (iii) agriculture. In these sectors, employment fell by less relative to manufacturing (5-9 per cent in comparison to 12.2 per cent), even after controlling for the changes in sales revenues. Inelastic domestic demand for some of the aforementioned services, market power and a high share of self-governing fi rms (family businesses, partnerships of friends and relatives) are factors potentially explaining why employment suff ered so much less in these industries. Trade-off s between employment and hours and/or wages do not seem to via free access play a role: the changes of employment and hours were positively correlated, while the industry wage eff ects were statistically insignifi cant, with only two exceptions. State-owned fi rms lost fewer jobs than did domestic private ones by 3.6 per cent and maintained average hours at a higher level by 0.6 per cent. In terms of wages they did not diff er from their private counterparts. The estimates relating to foreign fi rms are insignifi cant and hint at negligible diff erences between them and domestic private enterprises.
Exposure to changes in the minimum wage is measured by the fraction earning the base minimum wage (MW±1,000 Ft or 4€ a month) and the skilled minimum wage (SMW±1,000 Ft). More workers paid the MW in the base period predicts faster average wage growth, but having more SMW earners has no wage eff ect because the SMW barely increased in 2009. A fi rm with only MW earners increased the average wage faster by about 4 per cent in comparison to a company with no MW earners, consistent with the fact that the base MW grew by 3.6 per cent. At the same time, we do not observe larger-than-average employment and hours cuts in fi rms with more MW earners. Firms with many SMW workers did lose more jobs and also cut working hours more than did their otherwise similar counterparts, but these cuts are hardly explained by the tiny rise in the SMW. We conclude from these data that, while fi rms exposed to the minimum wage regulations increased wages faster and destroyed more jobs, these developments were explained by factors other than the modest hikes in the MW and the SMW.
Finally, the estimates suggest that fi rms covered by collective agreements kept the level of employment higher by about 2 per cent in comparison to their observationally similar counterparts. The estimates relating to working hours are insignifi cant. It seems that wages grew slightly faster than elsewhere, but the coeffi cients are not signifi cant at conventional levels.
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To summarize the regression results, the employment eff ects of the variables in equation (7.1a) are mainly signifi cant and often fairly strong. The variations in average working hours seem much smaller, while wage evolutions were largely unrelated to the variables in the model. Apart from the variables depicting the base-period composition of the workforce and the share of MW earners, other variables in equation (7.1c) -such as sector, ownership, fi rm size and unionization -did not exert statistically signifi cant eff ects on wage evolution.
Re-estimating the wage equation with x rather than D ln w on the left hand yields a single signifi cant coeffi cient: a fraction paid the MW, a coeffi cient of 0.0525 signifi cant at the 1 per cent level. Since x captures the change in the cost of labour much more precisely than D ln w we con-clude that wage developments were unrelated to industry, fi rm size, ownership, union coverage and region. 13 On closer inspection, the same seems to apply to the eff ect of skill composition. The employment and wage equations (7.1a, 7.1c) give the impression that fi rms with a skilled labour force adapted to the crisis by cutting wages, but keeping employment relatively high -an outcome consistent with expectations grounded in the theories of quasi-fi xed costs and fi rm-specifi c skills. The re-estimated equation suggests that the cost of labour actually did not fall in these enterprises -this is a statistical illusion generated by the changing composition of the staff . Firms employing many skilled workers dismissed more skilled workers, even in relative terms, which led to lower average wages.
The close-to-zero correlations between the residuals u, v and w of equations (7.1a-7.1c) suggest that the fi rm-specifi c changes of employment and hours, and employment and hourly wages, were independent of each other. By contrast, the residual changes in hours and hourly wages are relatively strongly correlated (-0.31). This result arises for two reasons. On the one hand, monthly earnings do not fall proportionately when working hours are cut, therefore falling hours are associated with rising hourly earnings. On the other hand, errors in the reporting of hours can establish spurious correlation between DW and DH.
14 In view of this risk I estimated a system similar to (7.1) by dropping the hours equation and working with monthly rather than hourly wages. The residual correlation between the changes of employment and monthly wages amounted to -0.02 in this case, too, and the Breusch-Pagan test did not reject the independence of the two equations.
JOB LOSS, JOB FINDING AND ACCESS TO SUPPORT
What happened to the workers who lost their jobs during the crisis is the subject of the remainder of the chapter. The discussion is primarily based on panels built from the quarterly waves of the LFS. The Hungarian LFS follows workers for 1.5 years -households are interviewed six times and then replaced with a randomly selected new cohort. Utilizing the rotating panel structure of the LFS we can address the issues of job loss and job fi nding with some precision. We start by looking at the dynamics of job loss and job fi nding, continue with a study of benefi t receipt and close by summarizing what the available data tell us about active labour market policies (ALMP).
Job Loss and Job Finding
The LFS panels make possible the study of transitions from and to employment with some precision. Although we do not observe all fl ows in and out of employment we can observe whether an individual was employed in quarter t and not employed in quarter t + 1, and vice versa. Many of the short spells of employment and non-employment remain unobserved with such data at hand -a defi ciency we cannot avoid. Following Jenkins (1995), we estimate discrete time duration models, in which members of a risk group are followed over time. The conditional job loss and job fi nding probabilities are estimated using constant and time-varying characteristics (X and Z) and time spent in the risk group (t) as explanatory variables. In equation (7.3), the term f(t) stands for a set of dummy variables denoting that the person was employed (not employed) for 1, 2, . . ., T periods. In the case of employment, t is measured in years of tenure in the current job as a continuous variable, while in the case of non-employed individuals, t is measured with dummies standing for the months of joblessness. The function g(t) collects the parameters of a set of dummies measuring calendar time (quarters).
Pr(exit between t and t 1 1) 5 bX 1 gZ t 1 g(t) 1 f(t) Detailed estimation results are available in Köllő (2010a) . Here we start with the calendar time eff ects (Figure 7.2) . Surprisingly, we do not see a large increase in the job loss rate during the crisis: it jumps high in 2008 October-December but a similar hike could be observed one year earlier. The job loss rate followed an increasing trend throughout 2006-2009, and the period of the crisis seems to fi t the trend. By contrast, the job fi nding rate followed a decreasing trend in 2006-2008 and deteriorated markedly during the crisis.
We observe a dramatic slump in the job fi nding rate in July-December 2006 that was probably associated with the announcement of a strict austerity programme in June and the outbreak of political unrest and (Figure 7. 3). The baseline hazard captures how the risk of exit is aff ected by the duration of joblessness, holding other observed characteristics constant. 15 The anti-clockwise shift of the curve at t = 4 indicates that workers in the fi rstfourth month of unemployment found it harder to get back into employment after July 2008. At longer durations, the two curves fall close to each other -the novelty brought about by the crisis was the deteriorating position of the new job losers. Data from the LFS thus suggest that, while the rate of job losses further increased during the crisis, the rise of unemployment in 2009 was explained mainly by the cutting of hiring rather than a large increase in fi ring. Less hiring meant that the chance of leaving 
Figure 7.2 The impact of calendar time on the probabilities of job loss and job fi nding, Hungary
unemployment within a short time deteriorated markedly: the short-term unemployed were less likely to return to employment and more likely to slip into long-term joblessness.
Access to Passive Support
As a result of the dismissals and a slump in hiring, ILO-OECD unemployment grew from 7.8 to 10 per cent among males and from 8.1 to 9.4 per cent among females between July and December 2008 and January and June 2009 (Table 7 .8). Rates calculated using other defi nitions of unemployment followed a similar time path, and all the rates continued to grow in the second half of 2009. The ILO-OECD unemployment rate reached its peak at 11.8 per cent in the fi rst quarter of 2010. 16 The 'improving' composition of fl ows out of employment implied that a relatively large part of the new unemployed were entitled to benefi ts. The fraction of the short-term non-employed receiving insurance-based benefi ts (UI) or unemployment assistance benefi ts (UA) increased by 10 percentage points, while in the same period the share of those receiving pensions or childcare fell by a similar magnitude. 17 The proportion registered at a labour offi ce also grew by about 10 percentage points (Table 7.9). (Table 7 .10). Furthermore, the proportion of people who either wanted a paid job or were actively searching for one increased substantially among the unassisted unemployed. The fact that an increasing number of jobless people did not get any assistance obviously increased inequalities, fi rst between those in work and those out of work, but also between diff erent categories of persons out of work.
Access to Active Support
The direction of change in active labour market policies (ALMP) is easy to check in Table 7 .11: resources were directed from the existing schemes to the provision of job retention subsidies and the extension of public works schemes. These programmes involved an additional 110,000 workers, while all other programmes were cut and the staff of the PES was curtailed by 5 per cent. The government's eff orts were visibly directed at keeping employment as high as possible, even at the cost of reducing active support for the unemployed. The costs of the job retention and public works programmes are diffi cult to assess. According to the data summarized in Table 7 .12, about 19 billion HUF (70 million euros) was spent on job retention subsidies. The stock of workers in public works grew by 30,000 in 2008 30,000 in -2009 30,000 in (CSO 2010 , while the monthly cost of a job -assuming that the take-home pay was equal to the minimum wage -was estimated to be 89,000 HUF. This adds up to a total cost of at least 32 billion HUF. The additional costs of the two programmes together thus amounts to a minimum of 51 billion HUF -a substantial amount equal to almost 2.5 times the total annual operative and development budget of the PES. How many additional jobs were fi nanced from this substantial amount? On the one hand, we have an additional stock of 30,000 workers in public works at the cost of about 32 billion HUF. On the other hand, we have an unknown stock of workers staying in their jobs thanks to the job retention subsidies. The amount spent on the job retention programmes could have fi nanced about 18,000 person-years paid at the minimum wage. This is a lower-bound estimate of the 'saved' jobs since many jobs could be saved at the cost of relatively small subsidies. The number of jobs planned to be 'saved' by the enterprises receiving job retention subsidies (53,461) is definitely an excessive upper-bound estimate. Accepting this fi gure and adding the number of aff ected workers in other programmes, we come to a naïve upper-bound estimate of 75,000.
Putting the pieces together, and assuming away the deadweight loss and crowding-out eff ects inherent in such programmes, we get the result that job retention subsidies and public works together may have reduced Notes:
a) The fi gures relate to cumulative annual infl ows to the given programme. Data on stocks and/or the duration of support are not available, except for public works. b) These subsidies are targeted at the long-term unemployed, mothers returning from childcare leave and school leavers.
Sources: CSO (2010, 27) , data provided by the PES and the Treasury. Data on the PES staff were provided by the Budapest Institute of Public Policy Research and are based on the annual budgets of the Republic of Hungary.
the loss of jobs by about 50-100,000. At the same time, the registered unemployment stock increased by 140,000 (between 2008.Q3 and 2009.Q3) , and the budget for assisting the actual job losers was signifi cantly held back by the huge amounts spent on employment subsidies. The eff ect of active labour market policies on overall equality is diffi cult to assess. The concentration of resources to save a relatively small number of jobs (together with the cutting of other active programmes) obviously created inequalities among potential job losers and adversely aff ected the position of the unemployed in comparison to those in work. At the same time, letting the jobs at risk die would have entailed even higher unemployment and higher income disparity. The balance is impossible to draw without knowing how many jobs were actually saved by means of the job retention subsidies.
A NOTE ON INDEBTED HOUSEHOLDS
In this chapter we have concentrated on the channels through which the contraction of fi nal demand and the spread of uncertainty aff ected income inequalities. The data and the fi ndings suggest that low-income families were likely to lose more during the crisis: the unskilled were Source: CSO (2010, 25-27) .
János Köllo -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:31:54PM via free access more likely to lose their jobs, many marginal workers were left without fi nancial support after job loss and several social transfers were curtailed. At the same time, the cutting of public sector wages, the growing diffi culties of fi nding a job within a short time and some of the austerity measures (such as the abolition of the thirteenth-month pensions and family allowances) aff ected middle and high income groups, too, and thereby acted against a large increase in inequality. Consistent with these expectations, in a recently published report based on the biannual Tárki Monitor Survey, Tóth and Medgyesi (2010) fi nd that the overall measures of income inequity, such as the Gini, changed marginally in 2007-2009, but the position of the lowest income decile got worse: its share in total income fell from 3.5 to 3.1 per cent and the P10/P50 ratio fell from 55 to 51 per cent in 2007-2009. However, in order to understand the nature and severity of the crisis in Hungary, one must consider factors beyond earned income and pecuniary transfers. Despite a relatively small increase of income inequity, the proportion of households reporting fi nancial hardship and deprivation grew substantially, from 23 per cent in 2007 to 30 per cent in 2009 (Tóth and Medgyesi 2010) . This increase refl ects the inability of a growing number of households to pay their bills and make their monthly payments to banks. The rising price of gas, water and electricity, on the one hand, and the skyrocketing payments to banks (due to the depreciation of the forint and rising domestic interest rates), on the other, entailed insurmountable diffi culties for many households, including those with unchanged monetary income. The implications for families indebted in hard currency (accounting for 70 per cent of all debtors) was and still is particularly severe. In the years preceding the crisis, the large interest rate diff erential stimulated hard currency borrowing, while the inherent risks were unclear for many -perhaps the majority of -borrowers. The government, the fi nancial supervisory authority and the central bank did not warn debtors, or did so ineff ectively. Tóth and Medgyesi estimate that in January 2010 debt payments amounted to 24 per cent of the total income of households with some debts (35 per cent of all households), with the debt service to income ratio being only 15 per cent in the upper income quintile, but as high as 43 per cent in the lowest quintile. The fraction of households unable to pay their forint debts (at least once) amounted to only 4 per cent in the upper quintile, but 33 per cent in the lowest quintile. The respective fi gures were 10 and 47 per cent, respectively, among households with hard currency debt. Several plans have been worked out in order to prevent these households from losing their homes but few of these have been put in practice, so far.
TWO CASES OF ADJUSTMENT TO THE CRISIS, HUNGARY
A Case of Hard Adjustment
The Firm belongs to a multinational electronics company, with divisions in a dozen countries in Europe and overseas. The Hungarian factory, one of the corporation's largest production units, delivers electronic appliances as a subcontractor -orders are received and managed by the company's centre located in another EU member state. About half of the multinational company's output is sold in Europe, with the rest going to North America and Asia. Within three years of its establishment -by greenfi eld investmentthe Firm became one of the largest employers in its region. In the past eight years, the level of employment has fl uctuated in a wide range, between 4,000 and 8,000, in response to the rise and fall of orders. During upswings, up to 40 per cent of the workforce was made up of temporary workers, who were typically employed on 30-day contracts, and were the fi rst to be released during downturns. Labour turnover has always been high among the Firm's own employees, too. Overall, the annual turnover rate was close to 30 per cent. While the factory is located in a mediumsized industrial and administrative centre, a large part of its workforce is recruited in high-unemployment villages and transported to work by buses operated by the Firm. The wages of regular employees are 20 per cent below the level paid by fi rms of similar size and 33 per cent below the level paid by foreign-owned fi rms of similar size.
The fi rm has been unionized since the beginning, and the local union is a member of a large industrial federation, in contact with its counterparts in the company's branches abroad. Unsurprisingly, the union's bargaining power has always been weak, given the highly competitive environment of the business, the fi rm's ability to relocate its activities and the possibility of hiring temporary workers. Failure to resist the fi rm's 'textbook capitalist' policies, as well as rival union leaders' competition for a shrinking membership resulted in the break-up of the original union and the founding of a second one in 2010.
The crisis started earlier in the fi rm's industry than elsewhere in Hungary. Output at constant prices fell by 2.7 per cent as early as 2008, which was followed by a dramatic decline of 14.5 per cent in 2009. 18 The multinational company lost 15,000 jobs worldwide, 60 per cent of its pre-crisis workforce, and closed its factories entirely in four European countries. The Hungarian factory continued to operate, but the management cut the level of employment from close to 8,000 at the beginning of 2008 to 4,200 in the spring of 2010. The redundancies aff ected temporary workers disproportionately, but even so more than a quarter of the Firm's regular employees were dismissed. After the redundancies, temporary workers accounted for 25 per cent of the total workforce.
Compared to the magnitude of the job losses, working hours and wages did not change signifi cantly. In May 2008-2009, average paid monthly hours fell by 1.5 per cent and monthly earnings went down by 0.7 per cent, implying a marginal (0.7 per cent) increase in the nominal earnings per hour of regular employees. In real terms, their monthly and hourly wages fell by 4.2 and 2.8 per cent, respectively.
Negotiations between the management and the unions could not infl uence the magnitude of the job losses, but imposed constraints on the selection of workers and the redundancy procedure. The protected groups included the members of consultative bodies (üzemi tanácsok), union leaders, labour safety inspectors, older workers expected to retire within fi ve years and single parents. The management guaranteed that it would not fi re two or more members of the same family within 30 days. The parties agreed on a 30-day notice period and full payment for this period without the obligation to work, thus allowing workers to start their job search and to register as unemployed as soon as notice was given.
The unions also accepted the postponement of wage increases in both 2009 and 2010, but managed to achieve a rise in the welfare fund, which provides support for children starting school, lunch coupons and access to sports and cultural facilities. Unions also achieved agreement that the fi rm would not (immediately and openly) shift the tax burden imposed on payments in kind in 2010 onto net wages. 19 At the time of writing, the Firm seems to have overcome the hardest period of the crisis -it is preparing for a modest expansion of output and the introduction of some new products -but it is unlikely to regain the thousands of lost jobs in the near future.
The case of the Firm nicely illustrates some of the economic and institutional conditions leading to the prevalence of 'adjustment on the extensive margin' in Hungary. It operates in a highly competitive and fully globalized industry, subject to large fl uctuations of demand, as do the majority of Hungarian industrial producers. It is a subcontractor competing with other suppliers within the corporation for orders, as do many of its counterparts in Hungary, where 40 per cent of the industrial workforce is employed in foreign-owned fi rms (mostly) of similar character. It satisfi es orders without accumulating output inventories and it has been customarily adjusting the level of employment to the fl uctuations of product demand. Similar to the majority (75 per cent) of the fi rms in its size cat-egory the Firm has a union and has always had collective agreement, but wages, non-pecuniary benefi ts, labour safety and redundancy rules, rather than the level of employment, have been the focus of collective bargaining. Institutions encouraging soft adjustment such as 'pacts on employment and productivity' or working time accounts are unlikely to develop, given the Firm's strategic choice of adjusting to cyclical fl uctuations via massive fi ring and hiring. Finally, although importantly, this strategy practically excludes the absorption of job retention subsidies, which typically require a guarantee of the continued employment of subsidized workers and/or a promise to maintain a certain level of total employment over a protracted period. 
A Case of Soft Adjustment
The meat processing industry, in which the Firm is engaged, was adversely aff ected by the fi nancial developments preceding and accompanying the crisis. The strong appreciation of the forint in 2007-2008 and the resulting shift of demand towards imported food had a strong negative impact on the sales prospects and liquidity of Hungarian producers. (Apart from the long-term tendency of appreciation in a catching-up economy, the forint's exchange rate was strongly aff ected by a shift to free fl oating in February 2008, high and repeatedly increased interest rates, high infl ows of foreign capital and the shift of domestic demand from forint-denominated to hard-currency-based credit.) In 2007-2008, real sales revenues fell by 6.7 per cent in the food industry as a whole, 21 while the number of meat processing fi rms under liquidation procedure increased by 24 per cent and the number of liquidated companies rose by 17 per cent. 22 The crisis brought a further, albeit less dramatic, contraction in 2009, with real sales falling by a further 2 per cent. The further decline in demand for processed meat and the credit crunch led to considerable labour shedding in the meat industry (3.5 per cent in 2007-2008 and 5 per cent in 2008-2009 in the fi rm panel analysed elsewhere in the chapter), and resulted in the fi nancial collapse of several medium-sized and large producers, including Herz, one of the leading companies in the sector.
The Firm under investigation had more than 800 employees in 2003, but several waves of restructuring brought personnel numbers down to 340 by the beginning of the crisis. Even so, it remained a key player in the Hungarian meat market and an important exporter. Over half of the fi rm's employees do unskilled and semi-skilled manual work, one-third are employed in skilled manual jobs and about 10-15 per cent in white-collar positions. Until recently, the vast majority of the employees have been working full-time and nearly all of them have had open-ended contracts.
The company is owned by a Hungarian industrialist, who owns several other companies in the sector. The enterprise is unionized, with a very high rate of coverage: 80 per cent as opposed to only 12 per cent in the Hungarian private sector as a whole.
The management had to respond to three major challenges during the crisis: (i) accommodating the unavoidable contraction of demand for its existing products, (ii) fi nding ways of entering more prosperous markets and (iii) maintaining the fi rm's access to short-term credit -vitally important for a producer working with very high material costs.
The Firm's choice of reaction was clearly infl uenced by its owner's confi dence in the long-run viability of the Hungarian meat industry, as was expressed in several interviews he gave during the crisis. 23 The management did its best to minimize the loss of jobs, applied soft forms of adjustment in agreement with the union and used the available government and EU funds extensively in order to avoid signifi cant downsizing. A list of the most important actions (and non-actions) is given below:
• The fi rm's level of employment did not fall; it even increased from 341 in May 2008 to 356 a year later.
• At the end of 2008, the fi rm was granted a government-fi nanced job retention subsidy, amounting to about 7 per cent of its total monthly wage bill and lasting for nine months. The subsidy fi nanced 25 per cent of the wage costs of 110 workers for a period of nine months on condition that (i) the selected workers were employed full-time, (ii) the fi rm's level of employment was preserved and (iii) quitters were replaced within 30 days by unemployed applicants registered at a labour offi ce.
• In May 2009, the worst period of the crisis, the management and the union agreed upon a 2.5 month-long period of working time reductions. The agreement gave the management the right to reduce the workweek of individual workers or groups by one or more days a week, up to a maximum of fi ve days a month, without paying compensation for the days off . This regulation applied to all employees except the 110 subsidized workers. The arrangement became eff ective and actually meant a shift from a fi ve-day to a four-day workweek. In exchange for the working time reduction, the management guaranteed that collective dismissals would be avoided.
• The working time reductions implied a 20 per cent wage cut for salaried employees and somewhat less for workers paid by piecerate, for a period of 2.5 months. On top of that, base wages and salaries were held constant throughout 2009. Overtime pay was disbursed with a delay, after making sure that total hours exceeded János Köllo -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:31:54PM via free access the contracted limit in a longer period. Non-pecuniary benefi ts and smaller side payments in kind were also curtailed.
• While before the crisis, most workers had open-ended contracts, workers hired during the recession were off ered a three-month trial period and fi xed-term contracts for six months. By July 2009, the fraction of fi xed-term contracts exceeded 10 per cent.
• In search of new markets, the fi rm opened a new product line in the spring of 2009. This operation was assisted by the New Hungary Regional Development Programme (an operative programme set up to allocate EU Structural Fund assistance) in the form of a lump-sum subsidy of 172 million HUF (about 570,000 euros). Furthermore, a state-owned development bank provided a subsidized capital investment loan of 179 million HUF (600,000 euros) and a working capital loan of 71 million HUF (240,000 euros). The owners added 150 million HUF (500,000 euros). The company hired 13 additional workers for the new division.
By July 2009, the Firm seemed to have overcome the crisis. Its market position was improved by the unprecedented depreciation of the forint and its expansive strategy seemed to pay off . The fi ve-day workweek was restored, none of the 110 subsidized workers has been dismissed and the level of employment was stabilized at about 350. The Firm even opened a new trade division in Budapest. We can identify several factors explaining why the Firm chose soft means of adjustment, and why its strategy proved successful. Among these conditions were its owner's faith in the future of the business, the presence of a strong and cooperative union, substantial contributions by the Hungarian government and the EU Structural Funds, and changes in the market position of Hungarian food producers due to an unexpected depreciation of the forint -a series of unusual conditions smoothing the way to an uncommon response to the fi nancial and economic crisis. 
CONCLUSION
The picture emerging from the data and the preliminary results draws attention to two traits of the 'Hungarian way' of adapting to the crisis: strong bias towards employment adjustment in the private sector, and strong bias towards job protection in the government's actions: the burden of adjustment in the private sector fell almost entirely on employment, while government actions were primarily aimed at keeping employment as high as possible. These actions included a two-digit, all-embracing real wage cut in the public sector, the preserving of the pre-crisis levels of employment in state-owned enterprises, the provision of job retention subsidies and the creation of public works opportunities. Apart from fi nancing the benefi ts of a growing number of entitled job losers, the government cut all other programmes aimed at assisting those who actually became unemployed. 25 The decision to try to reduce job losses and directly create statefi nanced jobs rather than extend unemployment benefi ts was deeply rooted in the spirit of employment policies followed in the decade preceding the crisis. In 2007, as much as 26 per cent of the registered unemployed receiving some kind of ALMP support were given wage subsidies and 37 per cent participated in public works (CSO 2010, 27) . Workers in government-sponsored jobs thus outnumbered the participants in all other ALMP programmes, including training, retraining, start-your-own-business schemes, rehabilitation and job search assistance (63 versus 37 per cent). A large programme designed just before the crisis (Pathway to Work) announced a further signifi cant expansion of the public works scheme. Extending 'passive support' was unequivocally ruled out by policymakers and the withdrawal of resources from unemployment relief was regarded as a price that must be paid for the reduction of job losses.
Despite creating and saving somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 jobs, according to the most optimistic and naïve scenario, registered unemployment grew relentlessly from 424,000 in September 2008 to 659,000 at its peak in February 2010 -an increase of 235,000. In the same period, employment (as measured by the LFS) fell from 3.924 million to 3.719 million -a decline of 205,000. It seems that the majority of those at risk of job loss did lose their jobs and have poor prospects of fi nding new ones because of a slump in hiring. Extending the duration of UI, loosening the entitlement and eligibility criteria of UA, expanding the existing ALMP programmes and increasing the capacity of the PES were probably unavailable options in a period of tight fi scal policies and largescale expenditure on job retention and public works. The policies chosen by Hungarian policy makers fi nally helped the lucky few rather than the unlucky majority.
The outlook for the near future seems uncertain. The economy is expected to grow by somewhere between 2 and 3 per cent in 2011, and employment is already on the rise (it grew by 1 per cent between October 2009 and 2010). The government that came to power in April 2010 will probably evade large employment cuts in the public sector by means of special taxes imposed on several 'high-income' industries (banks, telecommunications, energy and retail) and the confi scation of the savings of 3 million members of private pension funds. Although many analysts regard this kind of stabilization as unsustainable in the medium term, it is likely that 2011 will not see further downward adjustment as a direct consequence of the fi nancial and economic crisis. uniform SMW equal to 87,000 HUF, which implied the percentage changes quoted above. 7. This contradiction is apparent in the international comparative statistics, too. In terms of changes in the incidence of part-time employment in the early stages of the crisis, Hungary ranked thirteenth out of 36 countries compared in ILO (2009, 5) , while in terms of changes in the average number of hours worked per employed person it ranked thirty-fi rst, with a very small decline, falling short of 1 per cent. 8. The programme granted wage subsidies to selected fi rms, which reduced the workweek of their employees from fi ve days to four and provided training for them on the fi fth day. The competitive grant programme was conditional on the classifi cation of the subsidized workers as part-timers for the duration of the subsidy. 9. See: http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/tabl2_01_20_02ib. html. 10. Note that the Hungarian regulations do not distinguish short-time work from part-time employment unlike, for instance, the German rules (Kurzarbeit versus Teilzeitbeschäftigung). 11. The probit used to predict the probability of being an outlier and the regression results on all fi rms are available on request. 12. In Köllő (2010b) , where the fi rm panel is examined in more detail, the employment eff ects of collective agreements are further analysed with propensity score matching, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Becker and Ichino (2002) . Nearest neighbour matching suggested a statistically insignifi cant eff ect of 1.7 per cent, while the stratifi cation method and the kernel matching model resulted in signifi cant eff ects of 1.9 and 2.0 per cent, respectively. The paper also addresses the issue of endogeneity, that is, the possibility that good business prospects simultaneously imply favourable employment records and better conditions for concluding a collective agreement. The available data suggested that enterprises (probably) foreseeing that their industry's sales would fall faster were more likely to conclude collective agreements for 2009. Collective agreements were stimulated by hardship rather than expected improvements
